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Abstract
This letter provides a review of fundamental distributed systems and economic
Cloud computing principles. These principles are frequently deployed in their
respective fields, but their interdependencies are often neglected. Given that
Cloud Computing first and foremost is a new business model, a new model to sell
computational resources, the understanding of these concepts is facilitated by
treating them in unison. Here, we review some of the most important concepts
and how they relate to each other.
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Introduction
Imagine that you have to go on a trip to meet a friend in a different city. There are
many modes of transportation available to you. You can drive there by car, take a
taxi, share a ride in a van, take a bus or a train, or even fly there in an airplane.
Your choice is determined by your general preference for these options. In particular,
your choice depends on the economics and convenience of these alternatives given
the characteristics of the trip, including distance to destination and time available.
The cost of the choice you make in turn is related to how many other people are
sharing the same mode of transportation, and how expensive it is to operate the
transportation vehicle and infrastructure.
Now compare this choice to the choice of energy supplier that people faced in the
early 20th century. You could buy your own electric generator, but it was not very
cost efficient if your needs varied diurnally or seasonally. As it became apparent
that electricity was as invaluable of a commodity as gas, water and the telephone,
utility companies and national electrical grids that could aggregate and distribute
electricity on demand replaced the privately owned generators.
Cloud computing [1] could be seen as an effort to commoditize computing and
distribute and operate it as efficiently as the electrical grid while still offering con-
sumers the plethora of alternatives known from the transportation domain. The
pre-cloud era could be compared to everyone driving around in their own car and
using their own generators. The cloud era allows computing to be used similarly
to public transportation and makes it possible to tap into computing power with
the same ease that you plug in your appliances to the electrical grid at home. To
distinguish the Cloud from its predecessors it is often defined as a use of computing
resources that are delivered as a service over a network. The way in which you
provision these services holds the key to the innovation.
Cloud services need to be scalable, fault-tolerant, highly available, high-performance,
reliable and easy to use, manage, monitor and provision efficiently and economi-
cally. One early realization by Cloud computing pioneers was that meeting all these
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requirements for services handling massive amounts of data and huge numbers
of concurrent users called for innovation in the software stack as opposed to the
highly specialized hardware layer. The hardware is reduced to a commodity and the
Quality of Services (QoS) are instead provided by a fully integrated and hardware
agnostic software stack. Virtualization became the new silver bullet.
As the demand for compute power increased with more users coming on-line and
more data being published on-line it became apparent that some drastic architec-
tural changes had to be introduced to provision compute resources more efficiently.
The most prominent enabler for efficient resource provisioning was data center con-
solidation. Instead of using spare cycles from arbitrary privately owned nodes in a
network [1], it was more cost effective to provide high QoS by consolidating com-
puting in highly streamlined data centers packed with low-cost dedicated compute
and storage clusters in a highly reliable and fast network. These data centers were
also frequently deployed in areas where energy and labor were cheap to further cut
operational costs.
Data-center consolidation and more aggressive sharing of compute resources lead
to the following key benefits of Cloud computing:
1 Lower cost of using compute resources
2 Lower cost of provisioning compute resources
3 Reduced time-to-market
The first benefit can be attributed to only paying for the resources when you use
them. When you do not use them the provider can allocate them to other users.
Being able to host multiple users or tenants on the same infrastructure allows the
provider to utilize the resources more efficiently and thereby increase the return on
investment (ROI). This win-win relationship between compute users and providers
is the reason why most companies switch to Cloud architectures. The growth and
sudden popularity of Cloud computing was, however, not fueled by traditional,
established companies. Start-ups were the pioneering users of Cloud technology as
it reduced their time-to-market and provided them with less up-front risk to stand
up a demo or beta version. If the users did not flock, not much harm was done,
you just stopped paying for the resources. If there was an unexpected flash crowd
of people bombarding the service, you would just pay for more resources. This type
of usage is often referred to as the elasticity of the Cloud. The Cloud allows you to
scale down as easily and as quickly as you scale up.
Below we will review some of the fundamental concepts of distributed comput-
ing at scale, and then relate these concepts to economic principles that help us
understand the trade-offs governing their deployment. The main motivation for
studying these economic principles is that solely maximizing systems metrics, such
as, throughput, response time and utilization may not always be the most profitable
strategy for a Cloud provider.
Before delving into these principles we will first take a look back at technologies
that predated Cloud computing to see how the architecture of this new computing
paradigm evolved into its current state.
[1]as was done in many P2P networks at the time
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Historical evolution
The vision of organizing compute resources as a utility grid materialized in the
1990s as an effort to solve grand challenges in scientific computing. The technology
that was developed is referred to as Grid Computing [2], and in practice involved in-
terconnecting high-performance computing facilities across universities in regional,
national, and pan-continent Grids. Grid middleware was concerned with transfer-
ring huge amounts of data, executing computational tasks across administrative
domains, and allocating resources shared across projects fairly. Given that you did
not pay for the resources you used, but were granted them based on your project
membership, a lot of effort was spent on sophisticated security policy configuration
and validation. The complex policy landscape that ensued hindered the uptake of
Grid computing technology commercially. Compare this model to the pay-per-use
model of Cloud computing and it then becomes easy to see what, in particular,
smaller businesses preferred. Another important mantra of the Grid was that local
system administrators should have the last say and full control of the allocation
of their resources. No remote users should have full control or root access to the
expensive super computer machines, but could declare what kind of software they
required to run their jobs. Inherently in this architecture is the notion of batch jobs.
Interactive usage or continuous usage where you installed, configured and ran your
own software, such as a Web server was not possible on the Grid. Virtual machine
technology [3] released the Cloud users from this constraint, but the fact that it
was very clear who pays for the usage of a machine in the Cloud also played a
big role. In summary, these restrictions stopped many of the Grid protocols from
spreading beyond the scientific computing domain, and also eventually resulted in
many scientific computing projects migrating to Cloud technology.
Utility computing [4] refers to efforts in the industry around the turn of the millen-
nium to improve manageability and on-demand provisioning of compute clusters. At
this time, companies were very skeptical to running their confidential workloads off
premise and thus utility computing was often sold on a cluster-by-cluster basis and
installed on a company-by-company or organization-by-organization basis. This de-
ployment model made it very expensive to get up and running, which ironically had
been one of the key claimed benefits of utility computing. Nevertheless, it started to
become clear around this time that virtualization was the key to on-demand provi-
sioning of compute resources. Web services and Service-Oriented Architectures [5]
were touted as the solution to many of the problems seen in the earlier efforts of
Utility and Grid computing. Providing a standard API would allow infrastructure
to be allocated programmatically based on demand. The APIs and protocols were
borne out of the evolution of the World Wide Web (WWW) that started to provide
more dynamic and interactive content on Web pages leading to the phenomenon of
mashups. Mashups in the early days essentially scraped HTML from various Web
pages to dynamically create a value-adding service on a new Web page. As this was
error prone it was quickly realized that APIs were needed and the first Web services
protocols, such as SOAP [6], were designed.
By the time Amazon launched their Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) service in 2006,
both Web service APIs and virtualization technology (e.g. Xen[3]) had matured
enough to form a compelling combination or a perfect storm to deliver the first real
public utility computing service that had been envisioned a decade earlier.
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In summary, the vision of the Grid combined with Virtual Machine technology
and Web service APIs were the essential characteristics of the first Clouds. Next,
we will review the fundamental distributed systems principles underlying today’s
Cloud systems.
Computational principles
Multi-tenancy
A tenant in the Cloud context is a user of Cloud infrastructure, i.e. Infrastructure-
as-a-Service (IaaS) services [7]. A VM owner is an example of a tenant and if multiple
VM owners are allocated on the same physical machine it is an example of multi-
tenancy [8]. The difference between a multi-(end)-user service and a multi-tenant
service is that a multi-user offering may benefit from having users know about each
other and explicitly share social content to promote the network effect. A multi-
tenant solution could internally benefit from shared physical resources but must
give the impression of an exclusive offering to each of the tenants. As an example,
hosting the Facebook service on a Web server in the Cloud would be an example of
a multi-user service, but hosting both a Twitter Web server and a Facebook Web
server in the same Cloud data center would be an example of multi-tenancy. From
this definition it is clear that the IaaS provider needs to provide mechanisms to
isolate the tenants from each other.
Multiple tenants need to be isolated in terms of privacy, performance and failure:
• Privacy Isolation. Multiple tenants must not have access to each other’s
data. This may seem like an easy requirement to meet but in a typical file
system there may be traces left after a file even after removing it, which would
violate this property.
• Performance Isolation. Multiple tenants must not be effected by each
other’s load. If one tenant starts running a CPU intensive task and other
tenants see a drop in performance as a result, then this property is violated.
• Failure Isolation. If a tenant either inadvertently or maliciously manages to
crash its compute environment it should not effect the compute environment
of other users. Imagine a Java VM hosting multiple applications such as a
Tomcat Servlet engine. Now, if one servlet Web app crashes the VM, then
the other apps in the same VM would also crash. This failure would in that
case be a violation of the failure isolation property. Virtual machines offer
a popular technique to ensure isolation, but in some cases the overhead of
virtualization, of e.g. IO and network, is too high so a trade-off has to be
made between isolation level and performance.
Ensuring these levels of isolation is closely related to the strategy used to allocate
resources to tenants, which we will discuss next.
Statistical multiplexing
One major benefit related to data center consolidation that we discussed in the
introduction is statistical-multiplexing [9]. The idea behind statistical multiplexing
is that bursty workloads that are consolidated on the same Cloud infrastructure may
in aggregate display a less bursty pattern. Figure 1 shows an example of statistical
multiplexing with two workloads exhibiting complementing demand over time.
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1 Without an elastic Cloud infrastructure, the most common way of provisioning
resources to tenants is to allocate resources that meet the peak demand of each
workload. Clearly, this leads to a major waste in resources for the majority
of the time. Statistical multiplexing allows an allocation that is substantially
lower than the sum of the peaks of the workloads.
2 Ideally if statistical multiplexing is applied on a large number of independent
workloads, the aggregate will be stable, i.e. a straight line in the demand
chart. If this is the case, it is enough to just allocate the sum of the averages
of resource demand across all workloads.
3 Now assuming that we are in an elastic Cloud environment and we can slice
resource allocations by time akin to how an OS time-shares CPU between
processes. In this scenario further reductions in resource allocations may be
achieved by simply allocating the sum of resource demand across all workloads
in each time slice.
4 Finally if each time slice only has a single workload active at any point in time,
the allocation reduces to just the maximum demand across the workloads.
This model of perfect statistical multiplexing is hard to achieve in practice. The
main reason for this is that workloads tend to be correlated. The effect is known
as self-similarity. Self-similar workloads have the property that aggregating bursty
instances will produce an equally bursty aggregate, something that is often observed
in practice. However, there are many techniques to recreate the effects of statisti-
cal multiplexing without having to hope for it to occur organically. For instance
you could measure the correlation between workloads and then schedule workloads
that are complementing on the same resources. These techniques are sometimes
referred to as optimal packing of workloads or interference minimization [10]. Poor
statistical multiplexing tends to lead to low utilization, or unmet demand, as we
will discuss further when we review the economic principles governing under and
over-provisioning.
Horizontal scalability
An application or algorithm that runs in the Cloud will not be able to scale up and
down with the infrastructure unless it can run at least in part in parallel. Execution
in the Cloud requires efficient scaling across machines, referred to as horizontal
scalability. A local program running on a single machine on the other hand only
needs to scale vertically, i.e. run faster as local resources such as CPU, memory, and
disk are added. How well a program scales is thus related to the parallelizability of
its algorithms. This effect is formalized in what is called Amdahl’s Law [11]:
T (n) = T (1)(B + (1−B)/n) (1)
Amdahl’s Law predicts the expected speed-up of a program or algorithm when run
over multiple machines. T (n) is the time taken to run on n machines. B is the
fraction of the program that needs to run serially, i.e. that cannot be parallelized.
Note that several disjoint sections in the execution path may need to run serially to
collect, distribute or synchronize parallel computations. It is clear that minimizing B
maximizes the speedup. However, the most important consequence of Amdahl’s Law
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is that it sets a theoretical cap on how many machines a program will benefit from
running on, beyond which point adding new machines will not make the program
run faster. If B is close to negligible we can expect linear scalability. Adding x
machines will make the program run x times faster. If the program speedup grows
at a slower rate than the number of machines added, which is the common case due
to various overheads of distribution, we refer to sublinear scalability. The program
may also speedup at a faster rate than the machines being added, in which case
the program is said to exhibit superlinear scalability (see Figure 2). This effect may
happen if there is some common resource like a shared cache that benefits from
more usage, e.g., more cache entries and fewer cash misses.
Data partitioning
To achieve data scalability, i.e. scalable access to data, it is common to not only
replicate and distribute individual data items but also to replicate the database
instances. This design is very popular in Cloud data centers and is known as a
sharding or shared-nothing architecture [12]. Each shard or distributed database
instance is responsible for a subset of the data items or rows in a traditional RDBMS.
The notion of shared-nothing comes from the fact that each shard is a self-sufficient
denormalized store capable of handling all requests to the database for its allocated
subset of items independently. By banning merges between shards as is typical in
RDB joins one can ensure efficient data-parallel delivery of typically very large
items. Now, the main question is how to determine which item is stored in which
shard. This problem is known as data partitioning and there are two general solution
strategies. The data can either be partitioned by range or by hashing. In range
partitioning, the key range, e.g. an unsigned integer from 0 to 232 − 1, is split
into equally sized intervals and each interval is mapped to a shard. That shard is
then responsible for delivering the values for all keys in that range. The advantage
of this type of partitioning is that keys that are often accessed together may be
collocated on disk or cached in the same memory block and thereby be retrieved
very efficiently during range queries. For instance, if the range denotes geographic
locations, it may be used as a technique to query all information in a geographic
area, or if the range denotes time it could be used to get a history of all items in
a time window. The downside of this technique is that it assumes that the keys
are uniformly balanced across the key range, which is rarely the case. If fast access
to individual items and perfectly balanced partitions to accomplish a higher level
of data parallelism is a priority, then hash-based partitioning is more appropriate.
Instead of mapping the shards directly to key ranges they are mapped to ranges
of hashes of the keys. As long as the shards stay alive and can serve requests
for their hash partition reliably, this technique results in good load-balancing in
practice. Next we will discuss a refinement of basic hash partitioning when the
shards are unreliable, i.e. may go down and come back up dynamically, e.g. based
on elastic Cloud allocations to scale-up or down to meet demand. In summary, range
partitioning and hash partitioning are efficient for partial key scans and individual
key lookups respectively (see Figure 3 and 4).
Consistent hashing
If we add a new node to meet more demand or if a node fails or is taken down due
to low demand, then the hashed value, hash(x) mod n, will change for almost all
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keys x (see Figure 5). This change has the undesirable implication of having to move
many of the values of x between the shards to keep the index up-to-date. Consistent
hashing [13] is a solution to this problem that tries to minimize the impact, i.e. keys
that need to move between shards, if there is a change in shards serving the key
values, i.e. the number n. The basic idea is to organize the hashed key space in a
circle with values sorted in ascending order clockwise, known as the key ring, where
the maximum and the minimum values are located adjacent to each other at the
top. Now, both keys and shard IDs are hashed into the same hash space in the
key ring. To find the node that is responsible for storing the value of a key the key
is first hashed and then located in the key ring. The first shard ID encountered
moving clockwise on the ring will be contacted to retrieve the value. This technique
guarantees that only |x|/n keys need to be re-mapped on average, where |x| is the
number of distinct keys, whereas traditional hashing required approximately |x|
re-mappings. Today consistent hashing serves as the back-bone in many key-value
stores, popular in Cloud data centers, as well as p2p overlays, a.k.a. distributed hash-
tables (DHTs) [14]. Hence, consistent hashing handles node elasticity efficiently in
the Cloud.
To handle the case of node failure, and also to account for potential imbalance
in the hashed key space, shards are typically added to the key ring multiple times.
Shards may for instance duplicate key values stored in other shards located directly
to the left in the key ring, as they would be responsible for serving the keys should
these shards go down. How many times a value is replicated, depends on the read and
write semantics expected from the application, as well as the consistency guarantees
given. We discuss this trade-off between availability and consistency next.
Eventual consistency
Replication and duplication of data items in the Cloud is done to facilitate failover
but also to achieve data-parallelism. In the latter case it is not unusual to have a
very large number of replicas, in the extreme case one per node to allow each node
to process the data concurrently. Traditional consistency schemes known from the
RDBMs field, such as 2PC and 3PC are known to scale poorly if the number of
replicas is large and the nodes are unreliable. Hence, consistency in the Cloud is
often relaxed, to not strictly follow the ACID properties of a traditional database.
The window of inconsistency is the time between a successful update of a value until
the time all reads of that value return the updated value. The size of this window
that is allowed is application specific. Even within an application some updates that
are more critical may need to have ACID (window size 0) guarantees whereas other
values may allow a longer window of inconsistency. A series of techniques known
as eventual consistency [15], give a guarantee that an updated value will eventually
show up in subsequent reads. To understand the trade-offs the infrastructure has to
make to provide these guarantees consider an application with a data item that has
N replicas that needs to write successfully to W replicas for the whole update to
succeed, and that needs to read from R replicas to provide the requested consistency
guarantee. In a system where W+R > N it is clear that strict ACID-like guarantees
with a window of inconsistency of 0 may be achieved. In this case, the only trade-off
is what the values of W and R should be. For a WORM (Write Once Read Many)
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workload W would typically be greater than R, to allow for fast concurrent reads
but potentially slow and unreliable writes. In a system with a high-frequency of
updates, it may be worthwhile to reduce W and as a consequence increase R. Note
that any system can easily be turned into WORM by time-stamping each update
and thereby making them immutable. One example of a common configuration to
achieve fault-tolerance is N = 3,W = 2,R = 2 (see Figure 6).
Note that here it is allowed for one replica to fail to be updated as long as two
nodes may be successfully read to maintain consistency. In general increasing N
and decreasing W has the effect of increasing availability and thereby also data-
parallelism, but reliability and consistency may be reduced. Increasing R leads to
less data parallelism but improves consistency guarantees. It is easy to see that
allowing applications to specify N , W , and R essentially allow them to configure
the consistency and availability guarantees of the data items to be stored. Typically
in a practical application of eventual consistency the applications would hence just
specify the availability and consistency guarantees desired, and the infrastructure
would then map it to N , W and R values based on statistical guarantees (historically
measured values).
Quorum consistency a.k.a. Paxos [16] consistency is a strict guarantee where W
and R are both the majority set of replicas. It is a technique that is used primarily
for two practical reasons. First, it may be used to pick which is the new primary
node in the case of replicas that are organized as a single primary and a pool of
backups. The second common use is as a distributed locking service. During updates
of a commonly used, replicated file you may want to ensure that all other access is
blocked until the value is stored. According to the protocol, nodes that have voted
in a quorum will need to hold off on voting on other values until the initial vote
has been recorded. Voting here is analogous to approving an update and recording
is analogous to updating.
In summary, eventual consistency makes a trade-off between performance, relia-
bility and consistency. Next we turn to the economic principles to understand the
financial implications of various trade-offs made in system architectures.
Economic principles
Over and under provisioning
As we alluded to in the section on statistical multiplexing, over-provisioning is
a common strategy for allocating resources across tenants. Here we discuss the
economic dilemma of over (Figure 7) versus under-provisioning (Figure 8) resources.
We can see that over-provisioning leads to a large area of idle resources over
time. In financial terms this means high-operational cost, and lost opportunities to
increase profit. To increase profit the IaaS provider may be tempted to lower the
allocation to reduce the operational cost as seen in Figure 8. However, this leads
to an even more severe drawback, unmet demand. Unmet demand means revenue
loss, and can have long-term negative effects as customers who are denied access to
a resource despite being willing to pay for it may not return. For this reason over-
provisioning is more popular than under-provisioning. However, neither the IaaS
provider nor the tenant may be able to perfectly predict the peaks, after all that is
why they are running in the Cloud in the first place. In this case under-provisioning
may occur inadvertently.
Sandholm and Lee Page 9 of 19
Hence, over-provisioning versus under-provisioning involves making a trade-off
between profit and revenue loss.
Variable pricing
Given all the issues of allocating resources to bursty demand, it is natural to ask
whether this burstiness can be suppressed somehow as opposed to being accommo-
dated. That is exactly the idea behind variable pricing or demand-driven pricing.
The idea is to even out the peaks and valleys with incentives. If the demand is
high we increase the price. This leads to tenants who cannot afford the higher price
to back-off and thereby demand is reduced. On the other hand, if the demand is
low, a price drop may encourage tenants who would otherwise not have used some
resources to increase their usage and thereby demand. The end result is a stable
aggregate demand as in the statistical multiplexing scenario. The key benefits to
IaaS providers include the ability to cash in on peak demand by charging premiums,
and a mechanism to increase profit during idle times. Now, how can we ensure that
the price is a good representation of demand? Here, microeconomic theory of supply
and demand [17] helps.
If we plot the quantity of goods a supplier can afford to produce given a price for
the good we get the supply curve. If we plot the quantity of goods requested by
consumers given a price for the good we get the demand curve. The price at the
point where the supply and demand curves meet is called the efficient marker price
as it is a stable price that a market converges towards (see Figure 9). To see why
this is the case, consider the gray dot on the supply curve in Figure 9. In this case
the supplier observes a demand that is higher than the current quantity of goods
produced. Hence, there is an opportunity for the supplier to increase the price of the
good to afford to produce more goods to meet this demand. Conversely, considering
the black dot on the demand curve, we can see that the demand is higher than
the volume of goods that the supplier can produce. In this case the demand will
naturally go down and the consumers are likely to be willing to pay a higher price
to get their goods.
In general, variable pricing allows a provider to allocate resources more efficiently.
Price setting
There are many ways to set prices for goods in a market. The most commonly known
are various forms of auctions, spot prices and reservations. In auctions, bidders put
in offers to signal how much they are willing to pay for a good. In double actions,
there are also sellers who put in asks denoting how much they are willing to sell the
good for. The stock market is an example of a double auction. In computational
markets, second price sealed bid auctions are popular since they are efficient in
determining the price, i.e. reflect the demand, without too much communication.
All bidders put in secret bids and the highest bidder gets the good for the price
equalling the second highest bid.
In the case were there is not a completely open market price, that is there is
just a single provider selling off compute resources, spot pricing is a common way
of setting demand based prices. The spot price is computed on a running basis
depending on the current level of demand. There could for instance be a base pay
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that is discounted or hiked based on demand fluctuations. A spot market differs
from a futures market in that goods are bought and consumed immediately. Futures
markets such as options are less common in practical computational markets today.
Purchasing resources on a spot market involves a high risk of either having to
pay more for the same allocation or being forced to reduce the allocation to stay
within budget (see the section on predictability below). A common way to reduce
the risk for users is to offer a reservation market. A reservation market computes
the expected spot demand for some time in the future and adds a premium for
uncertainty to arrive at a reservation price. Essentially you have to pay for the
providers lost opportunity of selling the resources on the spot market. This way
the risk is moved from to consumer of compute resources, i.e. the tenant, to the
provider. If there is an unexpected hike in the demand and all resources have already
been promised away in reservations there is no way for the provider to cash in on
this demand, which constitutes a risk for the provider.
In summary, reservation markets move the risk of uncertain prices from the tenant
to the provider as uncertain demand.
The tragedy of the Commons
The next principle we will discuss is a social dilemma referred to as the tragedy
of the Commons [18]. The dilemma was introduced in a paper in 1968 by Garrett
Hardin, where the following scenario was outlined.
Imagine a public, government-owned piece of land with grass, in the UK referred
to as a Common. Now, a number of shepherds own sheep that they need to feed on
this Common to keep alive. The shepherds will benefit economically from the sheep
because they can, for instance, sell their wool. Each shepherd faces the financial
decision whether it would be more profitable to purchase another sheep to feed on
the Common and extract wool for, or provide more food to each sheep by sticking
with the current herd. Given that it is free to feed the sheep on the Common and
the reduction in available food is marginal, it turns out that it is always optimal
for a selfish shepherd trying to optimize his profit to buy another sheep. This has
the effect of driving the Common into a slump where eventually no more grass is
available and all sheep die and all shepherds go bankrupt.
One could argue that less selfish shepherds who are wary of the benefits of the
group of shepherds as a prosperous community will not let the situation end in
tragedy. However, there are many examples of communities that have gone extinct
this way. In general what these communities have in common is that there is a high
degree of free-riders, i.e. community members who take more from the common
resources of the community than they give back. Sometimes the effects are temporal
and not as obvious since no one purposefully abuses the community. One example
is the PlanetLab testbed [19] used by systems researchers in the US. The testbed
is distributed across a large number of organizations to allow wide area and large-
scale experiments. The weeks leading up to major systems conferences such as OSDI,
NSDI, SOSP and SIGCOMM see extreme load across all machines in the testbed
typically leading to all researchers failing to run their experiments.
The opposite of free-riding is referred to as altruism. Altruists care about the
community and are the backbone of a sustainable and healthy community. A good
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example of this is the Wikipedia community with a small (compared to readers) but
very dedicated group of editors maintaining the order and quality of the information
provided. The opposite of the tragedy of the Commons is the network effect where
more users lead to greater benefits to the community, e.g. by providing more content
as in the Wikipedia case.
The balance between free-riders and altruists as well as the regulations and pricing
of resource usage determines whether the tragedy of Commons or the network effect
prevails.
This concept is closely related to what economists refer to as externality [20],
individual actions impose an unforeseen positive or negative side-effect on the so-
ciety. The archetypical example is factory pollution. Such side-effects are mainly
addressed in the Cloud by various infrastructure isolation designs such as virtual
machines, or virtual private networks (see discussion in the section on multi-tenancy
above).
Incentive compatibility
One of the most frequently overlooked aspects of distributed systems is incentive
compatibility [21]. Yet it is a property that all successful large-scale systems adhere
to, the Cloud being no exception, and it is very often the main reason why proposed
systems fail to take off. It is a concept borrowed from game-theory. In essence, an
incentive compatible system is a system where it is in the interest of all rational
users to tell the truth and to participate. In a systems context, not telling the truth
typically means inserting incorrect or low quality content into the system to benefit
your own interests. Incentive to participate is closely related to the notion of free-
riding. If there is no incentive to contribute anything to a common pool of resources,
the pool will eventually shrink or be overused to the point where the system as
a whole becomes unusable. That is, the system has converged to a tragedy of the
Commons. Ensuring that the system cannot be gamed is thus equivalent to ensuring
that there is no free-riding and that all users contribute back to the community the
same amount of valuable resources that they take out. A new, untested, system
with a small user base also has to struggle with a lack of trust, and in that case it is
particularly important to come out favorable in the individual cost-benefit analysis,
otherwise the potential users will just pick another system. Tit-For-Tat (TFT) is an
example of an incentive compatible algorithm to ensure a healthy and sustainable
resource sharing system.
If Cloud resources are sold at market prices it ensures incentive compatibility, .i.e.
ensuring that the price is following the demand (in the case of a spot market) or
the expected demand (in the case of a reservation market) closely has the effect
of providing an incentive for both suppliers and consumers to participate in the
market. Earlier systems such as the Grid and P2P systems that did not have an
economic mechanism to ensure incentive compatibility has historically had a much
harder time of sustaining a high level of service over a long period of time due to
frequent intentional and non-intentional free-riding abuses. Hence, demand-based
pricing helps ensure incentive-compatibility.
Computational markets that have demand-driven pricing may however still not be
incentive compatible. If it for instance is very cheap to reserve a block of resources
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ahead of time and then cancel it before use, it could lead to an artificial spike in
demand that could dissuade potential customers from using the resource. This in
turn would lead to the spot market price being lower, which could benefit the user
who put in the original reservation maliciously. In economic terms it is a classic
example of someone not telling the truth (revealing their true demand in this case)
in order to benefit (getting cheaper spot market prices). Another classic example
is an auction where the bidders may overpay or underpay for the resource, just
to make sure competitors are dissuaded to participate or to falsely signal personal
demand.
Efficiency
Shared resource clusters such as the Grid, are commonly monitored and evaluated
based on systems metrics such as utilization. A highly utilized system meant the
resources typically funded by central organizations such as governments were being
efficiently used. This type of efficiency is referred to as computational efficiency. It
is a valuable metric to see whether there are opportunities to pack workloads better
or to re-allocate resources to users who are able to stress the system more, i.e. a
potential profit opportunity (see the section above on over and under provisioning).
In a commercial system such as the Cloud it is also important to consider the value
that the system brings to the users, because the more value the system brings to
users the more they are willing to pay and the higher profit the Cloud provider is
able to extract from a resource investment. This trade-off becomes apparent when
considering a decision to allocate a resource to a user who is willing to pay $0.1 an
hour for some resource and utilize at close to 100% versus another user who is willing
to use the same resource over the same period of time but at 90% utilization and
paying $0.5 an hour. There is likely more idle time and unused resources if the second
user is accommodated but the overall profit will be higher (0.5-0.1=$0.4/hour).
To evaluate the economic efficiency [22] one therefore often go beyond pure sys-
tem metrics. In economics, utility functions are used to capture the preferences or
the willingness of a user to pay for a resource. Maximizing the overall utility across
competing users is then a common principle to ensure an overall healthy and sus-
tainable ecosystem. This sum of utilities across all users is referred to as the social
welfare of the system. To compare two systems or two resource allocation mech-
anisms for the same system one typically normalizes the social welfare metric by
comparing the value to an optimal social welfare value. The optimal social welfare
value is the value obtained if all users (in the case of no contention) or the highest
paying user receive all the resources that they desire. Economic efficiency is defined
as the optimal social welfare over the social welfare obtained using an actual al-
location strategy. A system with an economic efficiency of 90%, for instance have
some opportunity, to allocate resource to higher paying users and thereby extract
a higher profit.
In essence, ensuring economic efficiency involves optimizing social welfare.
There is however an argument to be made that always allocating to the highest
paying user does not create a healthy sustainable ecosystem, which we will discuss
next.
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Fairness
Consider the case where some user constantly outbids a user by $.0001 every hour
in a competitive auction for resources. An economically efficient strategy would be
to continuously allocate the resource to the highest bidder. The bidder who keeps
getting outbid will however at some point give up and stop bidding. This brings
demand down and the resource provider may lose out on long term revenue. It is
hence also common practice to consider the fairness of a system. In economics a
fair system is a defined in terms of envy between users competing for the same
resource [23]. Envy is defined as the difference in utility that a user received for the
actual allocation obtained compared to the maximum utility that could have been
obtained across all allocations for the same resource to other users. The metric
is referred to as envy-freeness and a fair system tries to maximize envy freeness
(minimize envy). Having high fairness is important to maintain loyal customer, and
it may in some cases be traded off against efficiency as seen in the example above.
Fairness may not be efficient to obtain in every single allocation instance, but is
commonly evaluated over a long period of time. For example a system could keep
track of the fairness deficit of each user and try to balance it over time to allocate
resources to a user that has the highest fairness deficit when resources become
available.
In addition to fairness considerations, there could be other reasons why a resource
seller may want to diverge from a pure efficiency-optimizing strategy. If information
is imperfect and the seller needs to price goods based on the expected willingness
to pay by consumers, it may be a better long-term strategy to set the price slightly
lower to avoid the dire effects of losing trades by setting the price to high. Another
reason may be that some consumers have less purchasing power than others, and
giving them benefits, so they can stay in the market, improves the overall compet-
itiveness (and liquidity, see below) of the market, which in turn forces the richer
consumers to bid higher.
Liquidity
The central assumption in variable pricing models (see the section above on variable
pricing) is that the price is a proxy or a signal for demand. If this signal is very
accurate, allocations can be efficient and incentives to use versus back off of resources
are well aligned. If there are too few users competing for resources the prices may
plummet and the few users left may get the resource virtually for free. It is therefore
critical for a provider to have enough competing users and to have enough purchases
of resources for all the market assumption to come into play. In particular this means
ensuring that the second part of incentive compatibility is met, i.e. users have an
incentive to participate. Most providers fall back on fixed pricing if there is too
little competition, but that may lead to all the inefficiency that variable pricing
is designed to address. In economics this volume of usage and competition on a
market is referred to as liquidity [24]. Lack of liquidity is a very common reason for
market failure, which is why many financial and economic markets have automated
traders to ensure that there is a trade as long as there is a single bidder who sets
a reasonable price. A provider may, for instance, put in a daemon bidder to ensure
that resources are always sold at a profit.
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Predictability
The biggest downside of variable pricing models is unpredictability. If the price
spikes at some time in the future, the allocation may have to drop even though the
demand is the same to avoid breaking the budget. Exactly how much budget to
allocate to resources depends on the predictability of the prices, i.e. the demand.
If the demand is flat over time, very little excess budget has to be put aside to
cope with situations where resources are critically needed and demand and prices
are high. On the other hand, if some application is not elastic enough to handle
resource variation, e.g. nodes being de-allocated because the price is too high, a
higher budget may need to be allocated to make sure the application runs at some
minimal level of allocation.
Essentially users as well as applications have different sensitivity to risk of losing
resource allocations or resources being more expensive. In economics the attitude
towards risk is described in the risk-averseness or risk attitude property of a user.
There are three types of users that differ in how much they are willing to spend
to get rid of risk (variation) [25]. Risk-averse users will spend more money than
the expected uncertain price (i.e. hedge for future spikes c.f. the discussion on over-
provisioning and under- provisioning) [26]. Risk-neutral users will spend exactly the
expected price. Finally, risk-seekers will put in a lower budget than the expected
price to meet their allocation needs (see Figure 10). An application that is perfectly
elastic and that may scale down or up over time as long as the long term performance
is guaranteed may choose a risk neutral strategy. Risk seekers are less common in
computational markets, but they may be bettering on demand going down in the
future. Risk-averse users are the most common group, and the premium they pay
above the expected price is a good indicator for how much a resource provider can
charge for reservations, which essentially eliminates this uncertainty.
In summary, the elasticity of a Cloud application is highly related to the risk-
aversion of the resource purchase, i.e. how much to pay to hedge uncertainty.
Summary
We have discussed some computational principles underlying the efficient design
of Cloud computing infrastructure provisioning. We have also seen how economic
principles play a big role in guiding the design of sustainable, profitable, and scal-
able systems. As Cloud computing becomes more commonplace and more providers
enter the market, the economic principles are likely to play a bigger role. The so-
phistication of the market designs depends very much on the level of competition
and usage, a.k.a. as the liquidity of a market.
The key to a successful market design is to align the incentives of the buyers
and sellers with those of the system as a whole. This will ensure participation and
liquidity. Most computational principles in the Cloud are governed by the notion
that large scale distributed systems see failures so frequently that failover and re-
coverability must be an integral part of the software design. In order to failover
successfully one needs to have full programmatic control from hardware to end-user
application. An ongoing trend has been to develop platforms and cloud operating
systems that offer this level of software control of hardware to automate adminis-
tration, management, and deployment dynamically based on demand.
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Figures
Figure 1 Statistical multiplexing. Allocations for workload 1 (w1) and workload 2 (w2)
competing for the same resources.
Figure 2 Scalability. Superlinear - convex growth. Sublinear - concave (saturated) growth.
Figure 3 Range partitioning. Efficient for partial key scans.
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Figure 4 Hash partitioning. Efficient for partial key scans.
Figure 5 Consistent hashing. x1..x4 denote keys. If the Shard 2 machine goes down only key x2
needs to be reassigned.
Figure 6 Eventual consistency. Example fault-tolerant configuration.
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Figure 7 Over provisioning. Profit opportunities are lost due to many idle resources.
Figure 8 Under provisioning. Demand is unmet and therefore revenue opportunities are lost.
Service downtime may also lead to long-term revenue loss due to lost customers.
Figure 9 Supply and demand curves. The efficient market price is where the supply and demand
curves meet. Pricing below may lead to shortage of supply. Increasing the price towards the
market price will take the demand down to a point were it can be met.
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Figure 10 Risk attitudes. Risk averseness is the amount of money you are willing to pay to
remove risk. Risk neutral people will always be willing to pay the same amount for a lottery ticket
as the expected outcome or gain of the lottery.
